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FEDERAL COURTS-IN RE UNITED STATES-SHOULD 
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES BE DELEGATED THE AUTHORITY TO 
ApPROVE ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE ApPLICATIONS? 
INTRODUCTION 
In Katz v. United States, 1 the United States Supreme Court 
held that the protection of the Fourth Amendment applied to the 
subjects of electronic surveillance and, as such, law enforcement of­
ficials could not use a wiretap without first obtaining a warrant.2 
Shortly after Katz was decided, the 90th Congress enacted Title III 
of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act3 (the "Crime 
Bill") as a means of controlling the use of electronic surveillance. 
Title III was enacted to protect individual privacy rights while al­
lowing law enforcement officials access to a highly effective surveil­
lance technique. A few months later, the same Congress enacted 
the Federal Magistrates Act4 (the "Magistrates Act") to improve 
the efficiency of the federal judicial system by creating a tier of 
qualified officials to assist district court judges. 
In 1993, Judge Korman, presiding in the Eastern District of 
New York, delegated the task of approving a wiretap application to 
a United States Magistrate Judge,S raising the issue of whether the 
Magistrates Act authorized the delegation of Title III authority. In 
In re United States,6 the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit held that because the language of Title III did not 
specifically authorize delegation of wiretap authority to magistrates, 
the privacy concerns underlying the enactment of Title III pre­
1. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
2. Id. at 357. 
3. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 212 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510­
2521 (1988 & Supp. V 1993». 
4. Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1107 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.c. §§ 631-639 
(1988 & Supp. V 1993». 
5. In re United States Attorney, 784 F. Supp. 1019 (E.D.N.Y. 1992), rev'd, 10 F.3d 
931 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 64 (1994). 
6. 10 F.3d 931 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 64 (1994). 
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vented a magistrate's powers from being broadly construed in the 
area of electronic surveillance applications? 
The legislative history of the Magistrates Act clearly demon­
strates that Congress intended judges to make innovative use of 
magistrates in order to improve the efficiency of the judicial sys­
tem.8 It is equally clear from the legislative history of Title III that 
Congress designed that legislation to ensure the use of electronic 
surveillance would be subject to restrictions that would protect indi­
vidual privacy rights.9 This Note will examine whether the concern 
for individual privacy that motivated the passage of Title III pre­
cludes the delegation of wiretap approval to a magistrate. Part I of 
this Note will review the legislative history and judicial decisions 
underlying Title III as well as the legislative history and judicial in­
terpretation of the Federal Magistrates Act. A primary focus of 
Part I will be the criteria developed by the Supreme Court to deter­
mine functions which can be delegated to a magistrate. Part II of 
this Note will examine the reasoning of the Second Circuit in In re 
United States. Part III will reexamine the issue presented to the 
Second Circuit in light of congressional intent in passing Title III 
and the Magistrates Act and in light of prior judicial interpretation 
of the Federal Magistrates Act. Finally, this Note will conclude that 
the Second Circuit's narrow construction of the Magistrates Act 
was inconsistent with congressional intent and prior judicial inter­
pretation of the Act. 
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
A. 	 Legislative History of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control 
and Safe Streets Act of 196810 
1. Congressional Purpose in Enacting Title III 
Congress passed Title III of the Crime Bill for the dual pur­
poses of protecting the privacy of communications and creating a 
uniform standard for permitting law enforcement agencies to moni­
tor communications in criminal investigations.ll At the time Title 
III was passed, Congress found little uniformity among the states 
7. Id. at 938. 
8. See infra part I.B for a discussion of the legislative history of the Federal Mag­
istra tes Act. 
9. See infra part I.A for a discussion of the legislative history of Title III. 
10. 18 U.S.c. §§ 2510-2521 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
11. S. REp. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1968), reprinted in 1968 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2153. 
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regarding the approval and use of wiretaps,12 National legislation 
was needed to correct a body of state and federal law which was 
"totally unsatisfactory" in terms of providing for privacy rights and 
justice.13 
Although Title III was designed primarily to govern the use of 
electronic surveillance by state and federal law enforcement agen­
cies, Congress' concern for privacy rights necessitated that all uses 
of electronic sut:Veillance be controlled. As a result, Title III im­
posed a blanket prohibition on all electronic surveillance.14 Con­
gress then created an exception to this prohibition to allow law 
enforcement officials to employ electronic surveillance techniques 
when authorized by a "court of competent jurisdiction."15 The 
principal target of electronic surveillance was organized crime and 
Congress noted that communications were essential in conducting 
large scale criminal activity.16 Even though wiretaps were viewed 
as a necessary adjunct to the prosecution of organized crime, guide­
lines were required to prevent violations of the Fourth 
Amendment.17 
12. S. REp. No. 1097, supra note 11, at 69, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2156. 
13. Id. 
14. 18 U.S.c. § 2511(1) provides that it is unlawful for any person to intercept any 
wire, oral, or electronic communication; use any device intended to intercept such com­
munications; disclose the contents of such communication; or use the contents of such 
communications. ld. 
15. § 2516. Section 251O(9)(a) defines a court of competent jurisdiction as: "(a) a 
judge of the United States district court or a United States court of appeals; and (b) a 
judge of any court of general criminal jurisdiction of a State who is authorized by a 
statute of that State to enter orders authorizing interceptions or wire, oral, or electronic 
communications." Id. . 
16. Congress also noted the difficulty in locating witnesses willing to testify 
against criminal organizations due to fear or self-interest. S. REp. No. 1097, supra note 
11, at 70-74, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2157-61. 
17. The Senate Judiciary Committee was concerned that individual privacy was at 
great risk due to technological advances, noting: 
The tremendous scientific and technological developments that have taken 
place in the last century have made possible today the widespread use and 
abuse of electronic surveillance teChniques. As a result of these develop­
ments, privacy of communication is seriously jeopardized by these techniques 
of surveillance .... No longer is it possible, in short, for each man to retreat 
into his home and be left alone. Every spoken word relating to each man's 
personal, marital, religious, political, or commercial concerns can be inter­
cepted by an unseen auditor and turned against the speaker to the auditor'S 
advantage. 
Id. at 2154. See also Lori K. Odierna, Note, In re Motion to Unseal Electronic Surveil­
lance Evidence: Third Party Access to Government-Acquired Wiretap Evidence, 17 W. 
NEW ENG. L. REv. 371, 373-77 (1995). 
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2. Judicial Decisions Underlying Title III 
The history of Supreme Court decisions defining the permissi­
ble use of wiretaps begins with Olmstead v. United States .18 In Olm­
stead, the Court held that the use of a wiretap did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment so long as no other laws were broken by the 
law enforcement agents who installed and used the device.19 Con­
gress responded to Olmstead by passing the Federal Communica­
tions Act,2° prohibiting unauthorized use of electronic surveillance. 
The broad authorization to use wiretaps, which the Court granted 
in Olmstead, was gradually narrowed through a series of cases,2l 
culminating in Berger v. New York22 and Katz v. United States.23 
18. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). For a discussion of the evolution of Supreme Court wire­
tap decisions beginning with Olmstead, see Michael Goldsmith, The Supreme Court and 
Title III: Rewriting the Law of Electronic Surveillance, 74 J. CRIM. LAW & CRIMINOL­
OGY 1 (1990). 
19. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466. In Olmstead, federal officers tapped the phones of 
conspirators engaged in importing and distributing bootleg liquor during Prohibition. 
The agents monitored communications between the conspirators for several months via 
taps placed on phone lines outside their office and residences. In holding that the con­
spirators' Fourth Amendment rights were not violated, the Court reasoned that the 
prohibition concerning unreasonable search and seizure applied only to material things. 
The Court refused to read the Fourth Amendment broadly to allow for changes in tech­
nology. '''The Fourth Amendment is to be construed in light of what was deemed an 
unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted and in a manner which will con­
serve public interests as well as the interests and rights of individual citizens.'" Id. at 
465 (quoting Carroll v. United States,267 U.S. 132, 149 (1924». So long as the federal 
agents did not trespass on the property of those being tapped, the Court found there 
was no violation of Fourth Amendment rights because the telephone user "intends to 
project his voice to those quite outside, and that the wires beyond his house and the 
messages while passing over them are not within the protection of the Fourth Amend­
ment." Id. at 466. 
Although the Court was unwilling to find the Fourth Amendment prohibited wire­
taps, it noted that Congress was free to restrict the use of wiretaps by direct legislation. 
Id. at 465-66. 
20. 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1988) provides that "[n]o person not being authorized by the 
sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish the existence [or] con­
tents ... of such intercepted communication to any [other] person." Id. 
21. See, eg., Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937) (evidence obtained by 
wiretaps in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 605 is inadmissible in federal court); Weiss v. United 
States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939) (wiretaps are prohibited for the interception of intrastate as 
well as interstate calls). 
Subsequently, the Court held that the Olmstead standard applied to "bugging" as 
well as wiretapping. The installation of listening devices was held to be permissible, so 
long as no illegal physical trespass occurred when the listening device was installed. 
Compare Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114 (1942) (evidence obtained by a 
microphone placed against a common wall was admissible since there was no physical 
trespass) with Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) (evidence obtained by a 
microphone placed inside a heating duct was inadmissible). 
22. 388 U.S. 41 (1967). Berger involved the New York State eavesdropping stat­
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The provisions of Title III were designed to conform to the 
criteria developed by the United States Supreme Court in Berger.24 
There, the Court held that a warrant for the use of a wiretap must: 
(1) describe, with particularity, the person, place and/or things to be 
searched; (2) describe the specific crime committed or being com­
mitted; (3) describe the type of conversation sought; (4) limit the 
scope of intrusion to prevent the search of unauthorized areas and 
to end the search once the necessary evidence was obtained; and (5) 
provide that the executing officer make a return on the warrant 
showing how it was executed and the results seized.25 The Berger 
criteria are reflected in the authorization26 and procedure27 sections 
of Title III, which delineate in detail the procedure for obtaining 
authorization and using electronic surveillance devices. While Ber­
ger established the criteria that a warrant must satisfy, it was in 
ute. Berger was convicted for conspiring to bribe the chairman of the New York State 
Liquor Authority based on evidence obtained through a series of eavesdropping orders. 
The Court found the New York statute to be overly broad, resulting in a violation of 
Berger's Fourth Amendment rights. This violation was due to a failure adequately to 
meet Fourth Amendment criteria for the issuance of a warrant. Id. at 55-57. 
23. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See Samuel Dash, Katz Variations on a Theme by Ber­
ger, 17 CATH. U. L. REv. 296 (1968); Robert F. Scoular, Wiretapping and Eavesdrop­
ping: Constitutional Developments From Olmstead to Katz, 12 ST. LoUIS U. L.J. 513 
(1968). 
24. Congress noted that Title III was specifically drafted to meet the criteria out­
lined in Berger and to be in conformity with Katz. S. REp. No. 1097, supra note 11, at 
66, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2153. 
25. Berger, 388 U.S. at 55-57. 
26. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) provides: 

The Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, Associate Attorney Gen­

eral, or any Assistant Attorney General, any acting Assistant Attorney Gen­

eral, or any Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Criminal Division 

specially designated by the Attorney General, may authorize an application to 

a Federal judge of competent jurisdiction for, and such judge may grant in 

conformity with section 2518 of this chapter an order authorizing or approving 
the interception of wire or oral communications .... 
Id. 
Title III also lists the specific offenses which can be the target of electronic surveil­
lance such as: crimes relating to the sabotage of nuclear facilities; offenses involving 
kidnapping, murder or extortion; bribery of public officials; Presidential assassination; 
and unlawful use of explosives. § 2516(1)(a)(b)(c). 
27. Section 2518 provides: "(1) Each application for an order authorizing or ap­
proving the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communication under this chapter 
shall be made in writing upon oath or affirmation to a judge of competent jurisdiction 
and shall state the applicant.'s authority to make such applications." Id. 
Congress noted this provision was intended to conform to the criteria enumerated 
in Berger and to assure that a judicial authority be interposed between law enforcement 
officials and citizens per Katz. S. REp. No. 1097, supra note 11, at 97, reprinted in 1968 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2185. 
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Katz that the Court abandoned the Olmstead doctrine that physical 
intrusion was required to implicate the Fourth Amendment prohibi­
tion against unreasonable search and seizure.28 
Federal agents in Katz monitored a suspect's telephone con­
versation by placing a recording device on the outside of a public 
telephone booth.29 The government argued that, consistent with 
the Olmstead doctrine, no warrant was required because there was 
no physical intrusion into the booth.3D In Katz, the Court aban­
doned the Olmstead doctrine and held that any electronic eaves­
dropping constituted a search and seizure within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment.31 Once electronic surveillance was catego­
rized as a search and seizure, it became necessary for law enforce­
ment officers to obtain a judicially authorized warrant before 
initiating the surveillance.32 
The need for prior judicial authorization is addressed directly 
by Title Ill's requirement that applications for electronic surveil­
lance be submitted to "a judge of competent jurisdiction" who may 
approve or modify the application.33 Although electronic surveil­
lance fell within the scope of the Fourth Amendment, Congress was 
unwilling to grant comparable wiretap activity to all of the judicial 
officers authorized to issue search warrants. Congress specified 
28. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). 
29. Id. at 349. 
30. Id. at 352. 
31. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, reasoned that "the Fourth Amend­
ment protects people-and not simply 'areas'-against unreasonable searches and 
seizures." Id. at 353. Stewart noted that the Olmstead doctrine rested on narrow tres­
pass grounds that the Court would no longer apply: 
We conclude that the underpinnings of Olmstead and Goldman have been so 
eroded by our subsequent decisions that the "trespass" doctrine there enunci­
ated can no longer be regarded as controlling. The Government's activities in 
electronically listening to and recording the petitioner's words violated the pri­
vacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus 
constituted a "search and seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
Id. 
32. In Katz, the Court noted that the agents acted with restraint. The surveil­
lance was limited in scope and time and was confined to those periods necessary to 
obtain information. Id. at 354. 
The surveillance would have been proper had the agents taken the step of seeking 
a warrant from a "duly authorized magistrate" prior to initiating the surveillance. 
"[T]he Constitution requires 'that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer· 
... be int.erposed between the citizen and the police .... '" Id. at 357 (quoting Wong 
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1962». 
33. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1988) (providing the procedure for interception of wire, oral 
or electronic communications). 
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that applications could only be approved by a "judge of competent 
jurisdiction"34 and defined that term, as applied to the federal judi­
cial system, as a "judge of a United States district court or a United 
States court of appeals."35 Thus, Congress effectively and inten­
tionally barred United States commissioners, who could issue both 
search and arrest warrants, from authorizing electronic surveillance 
applications.36 
In addition to limiting which judicial officers could approve an 
electronic surveillance application, Congress also limited which law 
enforcement officials could apply for a wiretap warrant.37 This limi­
tation was intended to create a clear line of responsibility within the 
Department of Justice as a means of centralizing authority and min­
imizing potential abuses.38 
In sum, Congress enacted TItle III to protect the privacy of the 
public in general·by establishing an outright ban39 on electronic sur­
veillance. Congress then enacted a detailed list of requirements to 
be complied with before the use of electronic surveillance by law 
enforcement officials could be approved.40 These requirements 
were designed to assure that authorization of the use of electronic 
surveillance would satisfy the constitutional criteria enumerated by 
the Supreme Court in Katz and Berger.41 
34. Id. 
35. § 251O(9)(a). Additionally, a wiretap may be authorized by "a judge of any 
court of general criminal jurisdiction of a State." § 2510(9)(b). 
36. S. REp. No. 1097, supra note 11, at 91, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2179. 
Commenting on the definition in § 2510(9), the Senate Judiciary Committee noted: 
Paragraph (9) defines "judges of competent jurisdiction." This definition 
designates the judicial officers whose responsibility it will be to supervise au­
thorized interceptions. Existing Federal search warrant practice permits U.S. 
Commissioners and city mayors to issue warrants (18 U.s.C. § 3021 (1964». 
This practice is too permissive for the interception of wire or oral communica­
tions. Only judges of Federal district courts or courts of appeal should issue 
Federal warrants. . . . This is intended to guarantee responsible judicial partici­
pation in the decision to use these techniques. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
37. § 2516(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). See supra note 26 for the text of § 2516(1). 
38. S. REp. No. 1097, supra note 11, at 97, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2185. 
39. § 2511 (prohibiting the interception and disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic 
communications). 
40. §§ 2516-2519 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
41. S. REp. No. 1097, supra note 11, at 66, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2153. 
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B. Legislative History of the Federal Magistrates Act 
1. The Original Federal Magistrates Act 
O;mgress passed the Federal Magistrates Act42 in 1968 "to 
abolish the office of U.S. commissioner and reform the first echelon 
of the federal judiciary into an effective component of a modern 
scheme of justice by establishing a system of U.S. magistrates."43 
The commissioner system contained a number of defects that 
prevented commissioners from becoming an effective component of 
the federal court system. Compensation was based on a fee system 
which limited earnings to $10,500 per year.44 This low salary level 
made it difficult to attract highly qualified individuals to serve as 
commissioners.45 Additionally, Congress believed that the pecuni­
ary interest created by the fee-for-service system was inconsistent 
with the neutral administration of justice.46 
Congress addressed the deficiencies of the commissioner sys­
tem through the creation of magistrates. In this way, Congress 
hoped to attract a higher quality judicial officer and expand upon 
the duties previously delegated to commissioners.47 Congress 
vested the magistrate with all powers previously held by United 
States commissioners,48 as well as the powers to hear and determine 
pretrial matters and conduct preliminary hearings on post trial 
motions.49 
42. 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-639 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
43. H.R. REP. No. 1629, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1968), reprinted in 1968 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4252, 4253-54. 
44. H.R. REp. No. 1629, supra note,43 at 13, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
4255-56. 
45. [d. Commissioners worked on a fee-for-service basis. Therefore, their total 
income was determined by the number of services performed. Because total income 
was limited by the $10,500 ceiling, there was little incentive for efficiency or productiv­
ity. Additionally, a commissioner was not required to be a member of the bar, and in 
1968, nearly one third of the commissioners were not lawyers. This, in tum, meant that 
commissioners often lacked the requisite education to deal with the rules of law they 
sought to apply. Id. 
46. Id. 
47. H.R. REp. No. 1629, supra note 43 at 14, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
4257. 
48. 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)(I) (1988). 
49. Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1107 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.c. § 636 
(1988». These powers arose from the "additional duties" clause. A magistrate could 
be assigned: 
[S]uch additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws 
of the United States. The additional duties authorized by the rule may in­
clude, but are not restricted to­
(1) service as a special master in an appropriate civil action ... ; 
1996] FEDERAL MAGISTRATES AND TITLE III AUTHORITY 279 

Other sections of the Federal Magistrates Act were designed to 
eliminate specific deficiencies in the commissioner system. Under 
the Act, magistrates are required to be a member of the bar and 
their competence must be acceptable to the district judge making 
their appointment.5o Compensation of magistrates was set to ap­
proximate that of district court judges,51 and, unlike commissioners, 
magistrates were reimbursed for their expenses.52 Together, these 
factors eliminated the questionable practice of commissioners 
working on a fee-for-service basis and helped attract better quali­
fied personnel through an enhanced compensation system. 
Congress intended the district courts to make extensive use of 
these new judicial officers. 53 The language of the original Magis­
trates Act granted a district court judge broad discretion to assign 
tasks under the "additional duties" clause.54 Magistrates were 
given the authority to serve as special masters in civil actions, make 
recommendations to the district court judge regarding post-trial 
motions, and to assist the judge in pretrial proceedings. 55 
2. The 1976 Amendments to the Federal Magistrates Act 
District court judges were not as innovative in the use of mag­
(2) assistance to a district court judge in the conduct of pretrial or discovery 
proceedings in civil or criminal actions; and 
(3) preliminary review of applications for post[-]trial relief made by individu­
als convicted of criminal offenses, and submission of a report and recommen­
dations to facilitate the decision of the district court judge .... 
Id. (emphasis added). 
50. § 631 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The House Judiciary Committee noted that 
local district court judges were in the best position to assess individual qualifications of 
a magistrate. H.R. REp. No. 1629, supra note 43, at 15, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
at 4258. . 
51. § 634. 
52. § 635. 
53. H.R. REp. No. 1609, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 7 (1976), reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6162, 6166. 
For a discussion of how district courts have employed the services of magistrates, 
see generally Carroll Seron, The Professional Project of Parajudges: The Case of u.s. 
Magistrates,22 LAW & Soc. REv. 557 (1988); CARROLL SERON, THE ROLE OF MAGIS­
TRATES IN FEDERAL DISTRIcr CoURTS, (Federal Judicial Center 1983). 
54. Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1107 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 636 
(1988). See supra note 49 for text of the original "additional duties" clause. In addition 
to the language of the original Act which clearly stated that the duties are not restricted 
to those explicitly listed in the legislation, the Judiciary Committee report also noted 
that the categories listed were intended to be illustrative rather than exclusive of the 
duties that could be assigned. H.R. REp. No. 1629, supra note 43, at 19, reprinted in 
1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4262. 
55. Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1113 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 636 
(1988». 
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istrates as Congress had hoped. Instead, courts took a restrictive 
view of how magistrates could be employed. 56 As a result, Con­
gress amended the Act in 1976 to clarify and define what was in­
tended by the "additional duties" clause.57 
Section 636(b) was completely rewritten. This section, known 
as the "pretrial matters clause,"58 permitted a judge to "designate a 
magistrate to determine any pretrial matter,"59 except for eight dis­
positive motions.60 The House Judiciary Committee Report on the 
amendment emphasized that, with the exception of these disposi­
tive motions, a magistrate had "the power to make a determination 
of any pretrial matter."61 Significantly, Title III authority was not 
one of the powers specifically withheld by the "pretrial matters" 
clause. Moreover, although magistrates were prevented from mak­
ing a final determination of the enumerated dispositive motions, 
they were permitted to make recommendations on these motions 
56. See Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461 (1974) (magistrate may not hold a habeas 
corpus hearing); Ingram v. Richardson 471 F.2d 1268 (6th Cir. 1972) (magistrate may 
not review Secretary's denial of social security benefits and make recommendation to a 
district court judge). 
57. S. REp. No. 625, H.R. REp. No. 1609, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in 
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6162. See also Brendan Linehan Shannon, The Federal Magistrates 
Act: A New Article III Analysis for a New Breed ofJudicial Officer, 33 WM. & MARY L. 
REv. 253, 258-59 (1991); Marla Eisland, Note, The Federal Magistrates Act: Are De­
fendants' Rights Violated When Magistrates Preside Over Jury Selection in Felony 
Cases?, 56 FORDHAM L. REv. 783, 786-87 (1988). 
58. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1988) provides: 
(1) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary­
(A) a judge may designate a magistrate to hear and determine any pretrial 
matter pending before the court, except a motion for injunctive relief, forjudg­
ment on the pleadings, for summary judgment, to dismiss or quash an indict­
ment or information made by the defendant, to suppress evidence in a 
criminal case, to dismiss or to permit maintenance of a class action, to dismiss 
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and to involunta­
rily dismiss an action. A judge of the court may reconsider any pretrial matter 
under this subparagraph (A) where it has been shown that the magistrate's 
order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law. 
(B) a judge may also designate a magistrate to conduct hearings, including 
evidentiary hearings, and to submit to a judge of the court proposed findings 
of fact and recommendations for the disposition, by a judge of the court, of 
any motion excepted in subparagraph (A), of applications for post[-]trial relief 
made by individuals convicted of criminal offenses and of prisoner petitions 
challenging conditions of confinement. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
59. Id. 
60. Id. See also H.R. REp. No. 1609, supra note 53, at 9-10, reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6170-71. 
61. H.R. REp. No. 1609, supra note 53, at 10, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
6170 (emphasis added). 
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that could be adopted at the discretion of the district court judge.62 
Further indication that Congress intended the Act to be 
broadly interpreted may be found in the introductory language of 
section 636(b)(1), which begins "[n]otwithstanding any provision of 
law to the contrary."63 The House Judiciary Committee Report 
stated the reason for the inclusion of this clause as follows: 
The initial sentence of the revised section uses the phrase 
"notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary-." This 
language is intended to overcome any problem which may be 
caused by the fact that scattered throughout the code are statutes 
which refer to "the judge" or "the court." It is not feasible for 
the Congress to change each of those terms to read "the judge or 
a magistrate." It is therefore intended that the permissible as­
signment of additional duties to a magistrate shall be governed 
by the revised section 636(b), "notwithstanding any provision of 
law" referring to "judge" or "court."64 
Congress also amended the Magistrates Act by creating a new 
"additional duties" clause, section 636(b)(3), that provides "[a] 
magistrate may be assigned such additional duties as are not incon­
sistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States."65 The 
original Federal Magistrates Act contained similar language.66 
When the Act was amended, Congress placed this language in a 
separate subsection to emphasize that the additional duties were 
not to be limited by other sections of the Act.67 This subsection was 
intended to encourage judges "to continue innovative experimenta­
tions in the use of [magistrates]."68 Congress believed such experi­
mentation would result in the assignment of a wide range of 
additional functions to magistrates,69 thereby improving the effi­
ciency of the federal courts by allowing judges to devote increased 
time to their adjudicatory duties.70 
The Federal Magistrates Act, its legislative history, and subse­
quent amendments show that Congress intended to grant magis­
62. § 636(b)(1)(B). 
63. § 636(b)(1). 
64. H.R. REp. No. 1609, supra note 53, at 9, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
6169. 
65. § 636(b )(3). 
66. See supra note 49 for the text of the original "additional duties" clause. 
67. H.R. REp. No. 1609, supra note 53, at 10, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
6172. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. 
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trates authority to determine a wide range of issues. This authority 
is only limited by the "Constitution and laws of the United States"71 
and the discretion of district court judges.72 This grant of discretion 
was intended to encourage judges to explore innovative methods of 
using the magistrate's position to improve judicial efficiency.73 
C. 	 Judicial Construction of the Federal Magistrates Act Following 
the 1976 Amendments 
While the specific issue of a magistrate's authority with respect 
to Title III was not addressed prior to In re United States ,74 the 
United States Supreme Court, in several cases, has considered the 
limits of a magistrate's authority. These cases identify the issues 
that must be resolved in analyzing a magistrate's Title III authority. 
1. 	 United States v. Raddatz75 
In United States v. Raddatz,16 the Supreme Court considered 
whether a magistrate could conduct an evidentiary hearing on a 
motion to suppress without de novo review by a district court judge. 
The Court first considered the Federal Magistrates Act which pro­
vided that a magistrate could not make a binding determination on 
certain dispositive motions, including a motion "to suppress evi­
dence in a criminal case. "77 However, the Court noted that the Act 
allows a judge to "designate a magistrate to conduct hearings, in­
cluding evidentiary hearings" and then make recommendations to 
71. 	 § 636(b}(3}. 
72. H.R. REp. No. 1609, supra note 53, at 10, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
6172. 
73. Id. Despite legislative history and amendments encouraging innovation, con­
cerns over constitutional limits on magistrates' authority have continued to discourage 
innovation in some courts. The Federal Courts Study Committee recommended that 
this problem could be alleviated through a study of the possible constitutional limita­
tions on magistrates. Additionally, the Committee recommended that judges be pro­
vided with a specific list of tasks which fall within the pretrial matters and additional 
duties clauses. REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, April 2, 1990, at 
80. 
74. 	 10 F.3d 931 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 64 (1994). 
75. 	 447 U.S. 667 (1980). 
76. Id. In Raddatz, the defendant moved to suppress incriminating statements he 
had made to law enforcement officers. The district court referred the. motion to a mag­
istrate over the defendant's objections. After a review of the findings, the district court 
judge adopted the magistrate's recommendation, again over the defendant's objection. 
The defendant's conviction was reversed by the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit, which held that the district court judge was required to be present at 
the suppression hearing. Id. 
77. 	 28 U.S.C. § 636(b}(1}(A} (1988). 
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the judge.18 The Act also provides that within ten days, a party may 
object to the magistrate's recommendation, at which time the judge 
shall make a de novo determination of the findings to which the 
objection was made.19 
The Court examined the interaction of these sections of the 
Act, as well as its legislative history, to determine whether Congress 
intended to require a de novo hearing, an actual rehearing of the 
testimony, or a de novo determination, allowing the judge to 
merely review the magistrate's findings. The Court found Con­
gress' intent to be "unmistakable." The Court stated: 
Congress focused on the potential for Art. III constraints in per­
mitting a magistrate to make decisions on dispositive motions. 
The legislative history discloses that Congress purposefully used 
the word determination rather than hearing, believing that Art. 
III was satisfied if the ultimate adjudicatory determination was 
reserved to the district court judge .... Congress intended to per­
mit whatever reliance a district judge, ... chose to place on a 
magistrate's proposed findings and recommendations.8o 
Since Congress intended to rely upon the district court's judgment 
regarding the weight to be assigned to a magistrate's report, the 
Court found that requiring a de novo hearing would frustrate the 
purpose of the Act.81 
After resolving that the evidentiary hearing was properly con­
ducted under the Act, the Court addressed the question of whether 
the defendant's right to due process required the presence of an 
Article III judge at the suppression hearing. This issue hinged on 
"whether the nature of ... the interests implicated in a motion to 
suppress evidence require that the district court judge must actually 
hear the challenged testimony."82 Despite the fact that a motion to 
suppress often determines the outcome of a case, the Court found 
that the interests involved in a suppression hearing were less signifi­
cant than those involved in a criminal trial.83 Additionally, even 
when the task of conducting the evidentiary hearing is delegated to 
a magistrate, the district court judge is in control of the process and 
78. Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 673 (quoting § 636(b)(I)(B)). 
79. § 636(b)(I). 
80. Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 676 (citations omitted). 
81. Id. at 676 n.3. 
82. [d. at 677. 
83. Id. at 678-79. The Court noted that the evidentiary standards in such a hear­
ing were different than those at trial and that even if a defendant was unsuccessful on 
his motion to suppress, the evidence could still be challenged at trial. Id. 
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makes the filial binding decision. The Court determined that the 
defendant's due process rights were adequately protected because 
the ultimate control vested in the district court judge and a suppres­
sion hearing involved interests of a lesser magnitude than those in­
volved in a tria1.84 
2. Gomez v. United States85 
In Gomez v. United States ,86 the Supreme Court considered 
whether the "additional duties" clause87 permitted a magistrate to 
conduct voir dire in a felony trial without the defendant's consent.88 
As in Raddatz, the Court first looked to the language of the Act 
and found neither specific authorization nor a specific prohibition 
concerning voir dire. 89 The Court noted that the limiting factors 
under the "additional duties" clause are the Constitution and the 
laws of the United States90 and that the Court would interpret the 
Act in a manner that avoided raising constitutional issues.91 The 
Court reasoned that the duties specifically authorized by the Act 
should serve as the framework for determining what additional du­
ties would be permissible.92 
In reviewing the legislative history of the Magistrates Act, the 
Court noted that Congress intended district court judges to make 
extensive use of magistrates.93 Additionally, a primary goal of the 
84. Id. at 679-81. 
85. 490 U.S. 858 (1989). 
86. Id. In Gomez, the defendant objected when the district court judge assigned 
a magistrate to conduct voir dire. The judge denied the objection but offered de novo 
review of any challenges. No challenges were made. The United States Court of Ap­
peals for the Second Circuit affirmed the petitioner's conviction, finding the delegation 
of voir dire within the "additional duties" clause of the Federal Magistrates Act. The 
Supreme Court reversed, holding voir dire was part of the trial, which meant the de­
fendant had a right to have an Article III judge conduct voir dire. 
87. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) (1988) provides that "[a] magistrate may be assigned 
such additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and the laws of the 
United States." Id. . 
88. Gomez, 490 U.S. at 860. 
89. Id. at 863. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. at 864. "It is our settled policy to avoid an interpretation of a federal 
statute that engenders constitutional issues if a reasonable alternative interpretation 
poses no constitutional question." [d. 
92. Id. "When a statute creates an office to which it assigns specific duties, those 
duties outline the attributes of the office. Any additional duties performed pursuant to 
a general authorization in the statute reasonably should bear some relation to the speci­
fied duties." Id. . 
93. Id. at 869 (citing H.R. REp. No. 1609, supra note 53, at 5, reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6172). 
285 1996] FEDERAL MAGISTRATES AND TITLE III AUTHORITY 
Act was to permit district court judges to devote increased time to 
their adjudicatory functions by delegating non-adjudicatory tasks to 
magistrates.94 Consistent with this purpose, essentially adjudicatory 
tasks would be more properly performed by a district court judge.95 
In 1979, Congress amended the Magistrates Act to expand a 
magistrate's authority in criminal proceedings with the express limi­
tation that the parties must consent to the magistrate's participa­
tion.96 The Court reviewed the provisions of the Magistrates Act 
and, in view of its subsequent amendments, concluded that the Act 
carefully defined a magistrate's authority in criminal proceedings . 
. TQe Court then reasoned that the limited grant of authority to pre­
side at trials involving civil matters and misdemeanors was indica­
tive of Congress intent to withhold authority to preside at felony 
trials.97 Therefore, the authority to conduct voir dire could not be 
implied from the general language of the Magistrates Act.98 
The lack of specific statutory authorization to conduct voir dire 
compelled the Court to consider the constitutional concerns impli­
cated in delegating the task to a magistrate. The defendant had a 
constitutional right to the presence of a district court judge at all 
stages of the trial. Finding that voir dire more closely resembles a 
trial rather than a pretrial proceeding, the Court concluded that the 
defendant had a constitutional right to require the presence of a 
district court judge.99 As a result, the Gomez Court held that a 
magistrate CQuid not be assigned to conduct voir dire without the 
defendant's consent. lOO 
94. Id. at ff72 & n.23. 
95. Id. at ff73. 
96. 18 U.S.c. § 3401(a) (1988) provides that a district judge may designate a mag­
istrate to try persons charged with misdemeanors. Even when a judge makes such a 
designation, a magistrate can only exercise this jurisdiction with the written consent of 
the defendant. § 3401(a)(b). 
97. Gomez, 490 U.S. at 872. 
98. Id. The Court expressed its concern that voir dire was the type of procedure 
which did not lend itself easily to de novo review because firsthand observation of the 
jurors' demeanor is critical in determining their suitability. This type of observation is 
best accomplished when jurors are first questioned and introduced to the case. Since 
direct observation is of such great value in evaluating potential jurors, the defendant'S 
right to the presence of an Article III judge is not adequately protected by a judge's 
reexamination of jurors. Id. at 874-75. 
99. Id. at ff72-73 (citing Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 374 (1892)). 
100. Id. at 876. 
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3. Peretz v. United States101 
1\vo years later, the Supreme Court again addressed the issue 
of whether a magistrate could conduct voir dire. The critical dis­
tinction between Gomez and Peretz was that, in Peretz, the magis­
trate impaneled the jury with the defendant's consent and no 
objection was raised until after conviction.102 Writing for the ma­
jority, Justice Stevens noted that the Gomez decision was limited to 
situations in which the parties did not consent to the magistrate's 
participation in voir dire .103 Because the defendant in Gomez had 
not consented, the assignment of the magistrate to conduct voir 
dire raised the issue of whether the defendant had a constitutional 
right to demand the presence of an Article III judge at each stage of 
the trial.104 Because of the constitutional question raised by the de­
fendant's objection, the Gomez Court had required a clear expres­
sion of congressional intent regarding a magistrate's authority to 
conduct voir dire .105 
Since the defendant in Peretz consented to a magistrate being 
assigned to conduct voir dire, the Court attached "far less impor­
tance ... to the fact that Congress did not focus on jury selection as 
a possible additional dUty."l06 Instead, the Court placed substantial 
weight upon Congress' intention to improve the efficiency of the 
judicial system and held that delegation of voir dire, with the con­
sent of the parties in a criminal trial, was consistent with congres­
sional intent.107 
The Court, in Raddatz, Gomez, and Peretz, applied traditional 
rules of statutory construction to determine whether a particular 
task may be assigned under the Federal Magistrates Act. The initial 
step was to look for specific authorization within the Magistrates 
Act. Since both the "pretrial matters" and "additional duties" 
clauses provide general grants of authority, language authorizing a 
specific task often does not exist. Where the language of the Act 
contained no specific authorization or exclusion, the Court deter­
101. 501 U.S. 923 (1991). 
102. Id. at 925-26. 
103. Id. at 927-28. 
104. Id. at 929-30. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. at 932. 
107. Id. The opinion makes frequent reference to the importance of magistrates. 
"[W]e recognize that Congress intended magistrates to play an integral and important 
role in the federal judicial system." Id. at 928. "[T]he role of the magistrate in today's 
federal judicial system is nothing less than indispensable." Id. (quoting Government of 
the Virgin Islands v. Williams, 892 F.2d 305, 308 (3d Cir. 1989». 
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mined whether the task was consistent with Congress' intent in en­
acting the Magistrates Act. 
As the Gomez Court noted, the duties specified in the Magis­
trates Act provided the framework for determining what Congress 
intended as permissible duties.108 The Court reasoned that if no 
constitutional issues were implicated, a task consistent with con­
gressional intent was within the scope of the Act. Finally, the Court 
has applied a more stringent analysis in cases which raised constitu­
tional issues.109 In such cases, where neither the Act nor congres­
sional intent was obvious, the Court has interpreted the Act 
narrowly, choosing the alternative which avoids the implication of 
constitutional questions. 
II. IN RE UNITED STATESllO 
A. District Court Proceedings 
In February, 1992, Judge Korman, serving in the Miscellaneous 
Part of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
New York, announced his intention to refer all applications for 
electronic eavesdropping orders to a United States Magistrate 
Judge for approval. lll Judge Korman found this delegation of au­
thority to be authorized under both the "pretrial matters"112 and 
"additional duties"1l3 clauses of the Federal Magistrates Act.1l4 
Judge Korman also found wiretap applications analogous to appli­
cations for search warrants and arrest warrants, which magistrates 
mayapprove.U5 According to Judge Korman, Congress' stated ob­
jective of allowing a district court judge to devote more time to ad­
judicatory duties would be furthered by delegating wiretap 
authority to magistrates.u6 
108. Gomez v. United States,490 U.S. 858, 864 (1989). 
109. Id. See supra note 91. 
110. 10 F.3d 931 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 64 (1994). 
111. In re United States Attorney, 784 F. Supp. 1019,1020 (E.D.N.Y. 1992), 
rev'd, 10 F.3d 931 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 64 (1994). 
112. 28 U.S.c. § 636(b)(I) (1988). 
113. § 636(b)(3). "A magistrate may be assigned such additional duties as are not 
inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States." Id. 
114. In re United States Attorney, 784 F. Supp. at 1021. 
115. Id. at 1025. 
116. Id. at 1027. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1988) imposes follow-up duties on the judge 
issuing a wiretap order. The judge may require periodic reports while the wiretap is in 
effect. All recordings must be delivered to the judge who is responsible for sealing and 
maintaining custody of the recordings. [d. Additionally, the judge must file a detailed 
report with the Administrative Office of the United States Courts within thirty days of 
the expiration of an order. § 2519. 
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On June 30, 1993, Judge Korman made his first referral. The 
United States Attorney then petitioned for a mandamus review of 
the district court's order due to the government's concern that evi­
dence obtained under an electronic surveillance order issued by a 
magistrate would be ruled inadmissible. The government argued 
that authorization of a wiretap by a magistrate would violate the 
authorization provisions of Title 111.117 
B. The Majority Opinion 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
granted mandamus review and held that there must be explicit stat­
utory language authorizing magistrates to approve applications for 
electronic eavesdropping.118 
The majority's analysis focused on the language of TItle III, the 
Federal Magistrates Act, and the Electronic Communications and 
Privacy Act of 1986 (the "Privacy Act")119 as well as Congress' in­
tent in passing those acts. Since the Magistrates Act postdated TItle 
III, considerable attention was given to whether the language of 
Title III could be read fairly to include federal magistrates within its 
authorization provisions. Additionally, the court considered 
whether the language of the Magistrates Act could be construed to 
permit approval of wiretap applications.12o 
The Second Circuit, in its Title III analysis, employed a strict 
reading of the language used by Congress. The court found that 
congressional concern over the intrusive nature of wiretaps and the 
extensive detail governing the wiretap application process indicated 
that Congress intended the use of wiretaps to be strictly con­
trolled.121 As a result of Congress' privacy concerns, the court rea­
soned that magistrates must have explicit congressional 
authorization to approve these applications.122 
The majority's inquiry regarding congressional intent hinged 
on whether the authorization provisions of Title 111123 could be read 
117. In re United States, 10 F.3d 931 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 64 
(1994). 
118. Id. at 938. 
119. 18 U.S.c. §§ 3121-3127 (1988). 
120. In re United States, 10 F.3d at 934-35. 
121. Id. at 938. 
122. Id. 
123. 18 U.S.c. § 2516(1) (Supp. V 1993) requires that an electronic surveillance 
application must be approved by "a federal judge of competent jurisdiction." Id. See 
supra note 26 for full text of § 2516(1). . 
18 U.S.c. § 2510(9) (1988) defines a "judge of competent jurisdiction" as: 
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to include magistrates. The court noted that the phrase "federal 
judge of competent jurisdiction" was defined as "a judge of the 
United States district court or a United States court of appeals."124 
However, the court was unwilling to read this language expansively 
to include magistrates.125 
The Second Circuit found strong support for this proposition in 
United States v. Giordano .126 In Giordano, the Supreme Court had 
held that the Attorney General could not delegate the authority to 
authorize a wiretap application to the Attorney General's Execu­
tive Assistant.127 The Supreme Court found that such a delegation 
was limited by TItle III, even though the Attorney General had 
general statutory authorization128 to delegate duties within the Jus­
tice Department.129 Although the language of Title III did not ex­
(a) a judge of a United States district court or a United States court of appeals; 
and 
(b) a judge of any court of general criminal jurisdiction of a State who is au­
thorized by a statute of that State to enter orders authorizing interceptions or 
wire, oral, or electronic communications. 
Id. 
124. § 251O(9)(a). 
125. In re United States, 10 F.3d at 938. 
126. 416 U.S. 505 (1974). In Giordano, the Court considered whether to admit 
evidence obtained under a wiretap application authorized by the Attorney General's 
Executive Assistant. The application, which was approved by a district court judge, was 
submitted by an Assistant United States Attorney. The application inaccurately de­
. scribed the Assistant Attorney General as the authorizing official when it had actually 
been authorized by the Attorney General's Executive Assistant. 
The authorization provisions of TItle III have been amended since Giordano was 
decided in 1970. The authorization provision in effect in 1970 provided that applica­
tions must be authorized by "the Attorney General, or any Assistant Attorney General 
specially designated by the Attorney General." Pub. L. No. 90-351,82 Stat. 216 (codi­
fied as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (1968)). This provision was subsequently 
amended to enlarge the number of officials within the Department of Justice that were 
authorized to approve wiretap applications. The authorization provision now in effect 
provides: 
The Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, Associate Attorney Gen­
eral, or any Assistant Attorney General, any acting Assistant Attorney Gen­
eral or any Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Criminal Division 
specially designated by the Attorney General, may authorize an application to 
a Federal judge of competent jurisdiction for, and such judge may grant in 
conformity with section 2518 of this chapter an order authorizing or approving 
the interception of wire or oral communications .... 
§ 2516(1) (Supp. V 1993). 
127. Giordano, 416 U.S. at 514. 
128. 28 U.S.c. § 510 (1988) provides: "The Attorney General may from time to 
time make such provisions as he considers appropriate authorizing the performance by 
any other officer, employee, or agency of the Department of Justice of any function of 
the Attorney General." Id. (emphasis added). 
129. Giordano, 416 U.S. at 514. 
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pressly prohibit the Attorney General from delegating authority, 
the Supreme Court held that Congress' intent was to allow wiretap 
applications to be initiated only by those persons who were "re­
sponsive to the political process."130 
The Second Circuit found a strong parallel between the Attor­
ney General's responsibility to authorize wiretap applications and a 
district court's responsibility to review them. The authorization 
provisions131 and definitions132 contained in Title III contain no ref­
erence to magistrates. The majority reasoned that, since Giordano 
limited Title III authority to authorize wiretap applications to only 
those specifically named, approval of the use of wiretaps should be 
similarly limited. Since magistrates are not specifically mentioned 
in Title Ill's provisions, the court reasoned they could not exercise 
Title III authority.B3 
It is important to note that as Title III predated the Federal 
Magistrates Act, it was impossible for Congress to have included 
magistrates in Title Ill's provisions. The court considered this argu­
ment and found it unpersuasive since Congress could have written 
specific authorization into the Magistrates Act or amended Title III 
to grant approval power. l34 The court noted that Congress also 
could have addressed the issue in the Privacy Act135 but failed to do 
so. 
The Second Circuit rejected the district court's conclusion that 
a magistrate could assume the authority to approve wiretaps under 
130. Id. at 520. 
131. 18 U.S.c. § 2516(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). See supra note 26 for the rele­
vant statutory text. 
132. §§ 2510(9)(a), 2516. See supra note 123 for the full statutory text of 
§ 2510(9). 
133. In re United States, 10 F.3d 931, 938 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 64 
(1994). 
134. Id. 
135. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127 (1988), the Privacy Act, makes no mention of magis­
trates with regard to wiretaps. The Act does provide that an application for the use of a 
pen register or trap and trace device may be made to a court of competent jurisdiction. 
§ 3122(a)(I). A pen register records the numbers dialed from a telephone, while a trap 
and trace device records the numbers of incoming calls. § 3127(3). 
The Privacy Act defines a court of competent jurisdiction as "a district court of the 
United States (including a magistrate of such court) or a United States Court of Ap­
peals." § 3127(2)(A) (emphasis added). 
The Second Circuit found that had Congress intended magistrates to fall within the 
definition of a "Federal judge of competent jurisdiction," it easily could have amended 
Title III at the time the Privacy Act was passed. The Act did make several changes in 
the definitions contained in Title III but left § 2510(9) unchanged. In re United States, 
10 F.3d at 936. 
291 1996] FEDERAL MAGISTRATES AND TITLE III AUTHORITY 
the Act's "pretrial matters"136 and "additional duties"137 clauses. 
The enumerated powers granted to a magistrate contain no refer­
ence to Title III but rather give magistrates, inter alia, the right to 
assist the district court in pretrial matters.138 Although the "pretrial 
matters" clause includes the power to issue search warrants or 
arrest warrants, the court found these warrants were not analogous 
to wiretap applications. The court reasoned· that electronic surveil­
lance is much more intrusive than a physical search and therefore 
held that the authority to issue a search warrant did not imply the 
authority to approve a wiretap.139 The Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit recognized that amendments to the Magistrates Act 
were intended to prevent the Act from being construed narrowly.140 
However, the court held that, given Congress' overriding concern 
for protecting· individual privacy, expansion of a magistrate's au­
thority to include the area of electronic surveillance could not be 
justified.141 
C. Judge Cardamone's Dissent 
In his dissent, Judge Cardamone focused on the language of 
the Magistrates Act rather than on Title III. He reviewed the legis­
lative history of the Magistrates Act and found that Congress in­
tended a magistrate's powers to be interpreted as broadly as 
possible. Judge Cardamone noted that Congress had amended the 
Act in 1976 because courts had construed the Act too narrowly, 
inhibiting the judicial experimentation Congress sought to en­
courage when the Act was passed.142 
The 1976 amendment that rewrote the "pretrial matters" 
clause specifically provided eight exceptions143 to matters that fall 
136. 28 u.s.c. § 636(b)(I) (1988). 
137. § 636(b)(3). See supra note 113 for the full statutory text. 
138. § 636(b)(I). 
139. In re United States, 10 F.3d at 938. The court noted that Congress had specif­
ically withheld wiretap authority from United States commissioners who were replaced 
by the passage of the Federal Magistrates Act. Id. Congress felt that commissioners 
could not be entrusted with the responsibility to approve wiretaps, given the permis­
siveness with which they issued search warrants. S. REp. No. 1097, supra note 11, at 91, 
reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2179. See supra note 36 for the pertinent language. 
See also H.R. REp. No. 1629, supra note 43, at 13, repriTited in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
4256. 
140. In re United States, 10 F.3d at 938. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. at 939 (Cardamone, J., dissenting). 
143. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(I)(A) (1988) provides: 

A judge may designate a magistrate to hear and determine any pretrial matter 
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within a magistrate's authority. Judge Cardamone reasoned that 
these eight exclusions, coupled with the fact that Title III referrals 
are not mentioned, indicated that Congress did not intend to deny 
magistrates the authority to approve wiretap applications. Instead, 
the dissent found wiretap applications to be similar to search and 
arrest warrants which may be approved by magistrates under the 
authority granted by the "pretrial matters" clause. Judge 
Cardamone determined that search warrants, arrest warrants, and 
wiretap applications require magIstrates to make similar probable 
cause determinations.144 Based on the similar probable cause de­
termination required by all three types of warrants, Judge 
Cardamone reasoned that the authority to approve wiretaps was 
consistent with the matters that may be delegated under the "pre­
trial duties" clause.145 
Judge Cardamone noted that when Congress passed the Magis­
trates Act, the Senate and House Judiciary Committees recognized 
that it would be impractical for Congress to change every reference 
to a judge or court to include magistrates. l46 For this very reason, 
Congress inserted the language "notwithstanding any provision of 
law to the contrary" into the ACt.147 Since the specific purpose of 
this language was to eliminate the need for adding the term "magis­
trate" throughout the Code, the absence of the word magistrate in 
Title III was not, by itself, indicative of a congressional intent to 
withhold wiretap authority from magistrates. 
Judge Cardamone also reasoned that the "additional duties" 
clause was also a possible source of Title III authority. Congress 
provided this clause to allow district court judges the freedom to 
... except a motion for injunctive relief, for judgment on the pleadings, for 
summary judgment, to dismiss or quash an indictment or information made by 
the defendant, to suppress evidence in a criminal case, to dismiss or to permit 
maintenance of a class action, to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted, and to involuntarily dismiss an action. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
144. In re United States, 10 F.3d at 941 (Cardamone, J., dissenting). Although 
Judge Cardamone cites no case law supporting this analogy, it is consistent with the 
Supreme Court's holding in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In Katz the 
Court held that a warrant was required since the invasion of privacy resulting from a 
wiretap implicated the same rights as those involved in a physical search. Id. at 353. 
See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text. 
145. In re United States, 10 F.3d at 941 (Cardamone, J., dissenting). 
146. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
147. In re United States, 10 F.3d at 940. See also supra note 64 and accompanying 
text. 
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make innovative use of magistrates.l48 Indeed, such experimenta­
tion has generally been permitted so long as constitutional issues 
are not involved.149 Judge Cardamone found no constitutional con­
cern was implicated here, since the probable cause determination 
required by the Fourth Amendment150 is essentially the same in 
both wiretap applications and affidavits supporting search 
warrants.151 
III. ANALYSIS 
In In re United States, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit held that a magistrate could not be delegated 
the task of authorizing an application for electronic surveillance be­
cause such a delegation of authority was inconsistent with the goals 
Congress sought to achieve in enacting Title IIJ.152 Additionally; 
the Second Circuit held that the language of the Federal Magis­
trates Act did not permit delegation of wiretap approval to a 
magistrate.153 
However, a different result may be reached when the language 
of the Act is analyzed within the parameters developed by the 
Supreme Court in United States v. Raddatz,154 Gomez v. United 
States,155 and Peretz v. United States .156 In those cases the Court 
focused on the specific language of the Act, Congress' intent in en­
148. H.R. REp. No. 1609, supra note 53, at 12, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
6172. 
149. See supra part I.C, discussing Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923 (1991) 
(holding that a magistrate may conduct voir dire with defendant's consent) and Gomez 
v. United States, 490 U.S. 858 (1989) (holding that a magistrate cannot conduct voir 
dire without defendant's consent). 
150. The Fourth Amendment provides: 

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef­

fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 

Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma­

tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
U.S. CoNST. amend. IV. 
151. In re United States, 10 F.3d at 943. 
152. Id. at 938. 
153. Id. 
154. 447 U.S. 667 (1980). See supra part I.C.1 for a discussion of the Court's 
opinion in Raddatz. 
155. 490 U.S. 858 (1989). See supra part I.C.2 for a discussion of the Court's 
opinion in Gomez. 
156. 501 U.S. 923 (1991). See supra part I.C.3 for a discussion of the Court's 
opinion in Peretz. 
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acting the Magistrates Act, and the significance of the constitutional 
issues raised by the delegation of a particular task to a magistrate. 
A. The Statutory Language 
The Second Circuit's first step in analyzing the government's 
appeal of the district court's order was to examine the relevant stat­
utory language.157 The Court found it significant that neither Title 
III, the Magistrates Act, nor the Privacy Act158 contain language 
specifically authorizing a magistrate to approve Title III 
applications.159 
Although the language of the Magistrates Act does not include 
the authority to approve wiretap applications as one of a magis­
trate's enumerated powers, the list of enumerated powers is not ex­
Clusive.160 Additionally, the approval of Title III applications is not 
one of the items specifically excluded from a magistrate's power to 
"hear and determine."161 The "pretrial matters" clause gives a 
judge the power to delegate "any pretrial matter" to a magistrate162 
and Congress considered search and arrest warrants to be pretrial 
matters within the definition of the Magistrates Act.163 If wiretap 
warrants are a specific type of search warrant, it may be argued that 
they fall within the ~tegory of pretrial matters. 
Additionally, in Gomez v. United States,164 the Supreme Court 
held that a magistrate's additional duties must be based on their 
relationship to their specific duties.165 Magistrates have the author­
ity to issue search warrants and to approve the use of "pen regis­
ters" and "trap and trace devices. "166 In both instances, magistrates 
are making probable cause determinations involving privacy rights 
and in the latter case a form of electronic surveillance is being em­
ployed. Under the Gomez test, the additional duty-approving 
157. In re United States, 10 F.3d at 934. 
158. 18 U.S.c. §§ 3121-3127 (1988). 
159. In re United States, 10 F.3d at 935-38. 
160. See H.R. REp. No. 1629, supra note 43, at 19, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
al4262. 
161. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(I)(A) (1988). 
162. Id. 
163. See H.R. REp. No. 1609, supra note 53, at 6-7, reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6166-67. 
164. 490 U.S. 858 (1989). 
165. Id. at 864. 
166. See infra part III.B discussing the similarities among wiretap warrants, 
search warrants, pen registers and trap and trace devices. 
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wiretap applications-bears a strong relation to the specific duties 
already granted to magistrates. 
The Second Circuit also found it significant that TItle III itself 
makes no specific mention of a magistrate's authority. Of course, 
the definition in Title III could not have included magistrates since 
that judicial officer did not exist at the time Title III was enacted. 
A Title III application must be authorized by "a Federal judge of 
competent jurisdiction,"167 which is defined as either a federal dis­
trict or appellate court judge,168 Because magistrates are not in­
cluded within Title Ill's definition of a court of competent 
jurisdiction, the Second Circuit reasoned that Title III authority 
could not be delegated to a magistrate.169 The Court relied on 
United States v. Giordano,170 for the proposition that the language 
of TItle III is to be strictly construed.171 
Because a magistrate had never been delegated wiretap au­
thority, the courts have not had occasion to decide how narrowly 
the definition of a judge of competent jurisdiction should be con­
strued. Although the language of Title III makes no reference to 
magistrates, Title III cannot be read in isolation. The language of 
section 636(b )172 of the Magistrates Act was intended as a modifica­
tion of language throughout the United States Code,173 If, as sec­
tion 636(b) requires, the term "judge" in TItle III is read to include 
the term "magistrate," then Title III would implicitly grant magis­
trates wiretap authority. 
B. Congressional Intent 
Since the statutory language is not dispositive, the next step in 
the analysis is to determine whether the legislative history of the 
statutes indicates that Congress intended TItle III authority to fall 
within the scope of a magistrate's duties. The Second Circuit's 
holding that Congress had no such intent was based on its interpre­
tation of the legislative history of Title III and Congress' subse­
quent failure to either amend Title III or include TItle III authority 
167. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (Supp. V 1993). 
168. § 2510(9)(a). See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
169. In re United States, 10 F.3d 931, 935-36 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. O. 
64 (1994). . 
170. 416 U.S. 505 (1974). 
171. In re United States, 10 F.3d at 937. 
172. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1988). 
173. H.R. REP. No. 1609, supra note 53, at 9, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
6169. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
296 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18:271 
in the Magistrates ACt.174 
The phrase "a Federal judge of competent jurisdiction" was a 
focal point of the court's analysis. The Second Circuit relied heav­
ily on the report of the Senate Judiciary Committee as an indication 
of whether this phrase could be read to include magistrates.175 In 
enacting Title III, Congress made it clear that it intended to with­
hold Title III authority from United States commissioners due to 
dissatisfaction with the perfunctory manner in which they approved 
search and arrest warrants.176 The court reasoned that a judicial 
officer's power to approve Title III applications could not be in­
ferred from the fact that the judicial officer could issue search 
warrants.177 
The Second Circuit's conclusion is not as inevitable as it ap­
pears. Congress did not simply withhold Title III authority from 
commissioners, it abolished the office and replaced it with magis­
trates. The fact that magistrates were given duties that had been 
improperly executed by their predecessors, coupled with the more 
substantive duties granted to magistrates by Congress, provides 
clear evidence that Congress did not liken one office to the other. 
The commissioners' powers merely formed the basis for determin­
ing the initial powers Congress granted to magistrates.178 There­
fore, while it is clear that Congress intended to withhold wiretap 
authority from commissioners, it is not equally clear that the same 
restraint was intended to be placed on magistrates. The Second 
Circuit's conclusion that magistrates and commissioners should be 
subject to the same restraints is undermined by the fact that Con­
gress and the courts consistently have expressed high regard for the 
performance of magistrates since the office was established.179 
174. In re United States, 10 F.3d at 938. 
175. Id. The report is necessarily silent on the subject of magistrates because they 
did not exist at the time. The definition pointedly excluded United States commission­
ers however. Congress noted that commissioners were poorly suited to protect privacy 
. interests in the area of electronic surveillance, given their permissive practices in grant­
ing search warrants. See S. REp. No. 1097, supra note 11, at 91, reprinted in 1968 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2179. See supra note 36. 
When the same Congress later passed the Federal Magistrates Act, it once again 
noted that commissioners were too permissive in granting search warrants and arrest 
warrants. H.R. REp. No. 1629, supra note 43, at 13, reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4256. 
176. H.R. REp. No. 1629, supra note 43, at 13, reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4256. 
177. In re United States, 10 F.3d at 938. 
178. 28 U.S.c. § 636(a)(1) (1988) provides that a magistrate shall have "all pow­
ers and duties conferred or imposed upon United States commissioners." Id. 
179. See H.R. REp. No. 1609, supra note 53, at 4, 6 reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6164, 6166. 
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The Second Circuit's reliance on United States v. Giordano 180 
as a basis for finding Congress intended to deny magistrates Title 
III authority is also questionable. The legislative history of Title III 
cited in Giordano clearly indicates that Congress, as well as the De­
partment of Justice, intended to limit which officials within the De­
partment of Justice could initiate wiretap applications. 181 This 
limitation was created to ensure that any abuse of the process could 
be traced to a clearly identifiable and politically responsible individ­
ual who initiated the wiretap application. l82 The limitation on who 
could approve a wiretap was motivated by a different concern: that 
wiretaps were approved by a responsible judicial officer. That con­
cern may be satisfied by a magistrate acting under authority dele­
gated by a district court judge. 
Although Congress specified matters that a magistrate could 
not hear and determine, it still granted a district court judge broad 
discretion to allow a magistrate to hear and make recommendations 
on those very matters.183 Moreover, Congress required judicial au­
thorization of a wiretap in order to conform to the criteria enunci­
ated by the Supreme Court in Katz v. United States .184 The Court 
required that the "impartial judgment of a judicial officer ... be 
interposed between the citizen and the police."185 If Congress' pur­
pose was to provide an additional layer of judicial authority as pro­
tection for individuals' rights, this purpose may be satisfied through 
the use of a magistrate. 
Additionally, both the language and the legislative history of 
the 1976 amendments to the Magistrates Act make it clear that 
Congress intended the terms "judge" and "magistrate" to be used 
interchangeably throughout the United States Code.l86 Indeed, the 
only limitations on the magistrate's authority are those imposed by 
inconsistency between the Magistrates Act and the Constitution or 
"It can hardly be denied that the system created by the Federal Magistrates Act 
has exceeded the highest expectations of the legislators who conceived it." Peretz v. 
United States, 501 U.S. 923, 928 n.5 (1991) (quoting Government of the Virgin Islands 
v. Williams, 892 F.2d 305, 308 (1989». 
180. 416 U.S. 505 (1974). 
181. [d. at 514-23. 
182. S. REp. No. 1097, supra note 11, at 97, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
2185. 
183. 28 U.S.c. § 636(b)(I) (1988). 
184. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See S. REp. No. 1097, supra note 11, at 66, reprinted in 
1968, U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2153. 
185. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,481-82 
(1962». 
186. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
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the laws of the United States.187 
Although the court in In re United States conceded that Con­
gress intended the Magistrates Act to be interpreted broadly, it 
held that Title III is one area in which the Act is intended to be 
interpreted narrowly.188 The court found it significant that Title III 
had not been amended to include magistrates within the definition 
of "courts of competent jurisdiction."189 
The court also found it significant that Congress failed to grant 
magistrates Title III authority at the time the Privacy Act granted 
them the authority to approve the use of pen registers and trap and 
trace devices.190 Here the court misinterpreted the intent of this 
section of the Privacy Act. Rather than being a specific extension 
of magistrates' authority, the Privacy Act was passed as a limitation 
on the freedom of law enforcement officials to monitor telephone 
activity. Pen registers and trap an~ trace devices were consciously 
omitted from the restrictions of Title 111191 and, prior to passage of 
the Privacy Act, the use of these devices was not restricted.192 Pas­
sage of the Privacy Act made the use of pen registers and trap and 
trace devices subject to the warrant requirement contained in Title 
III. Thus, the Privacy Act provides protection of privacy rights by 
requiring the use of these devices be permitted only after proper 
judicial approval has been obtained. Since the Privacy Act specifi­
cally grants magistrates this authority, it is obvious that Congress 
believed magistrates were competent to protect privacy rights. 
It is clear from the legislative history of the Federal Magis­
trates Act and its subsequent amendments that Congress has dis­
played high regard for these judicial officers.193 Congress clearly 
expressed its intent that district courts should use magistrates in an 
expansive and innovative manner when it amended the Act in 
187. 28 U.S.c. § 636(b)(3) (1988). 
188. In re United States, 10 F.3d 931, 936 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 64 
(1994). 
189. Id. at 936. 
190. In re United States, 10 F.3d at 935-37. The Privacy Act specifically authorizes 
magistrates to authorize the use of these devices. See supra note 135 for the statutory 
language granting magistrates the authority to approve applications for the use of pen 
registers and trap and trace devices. 18 U.S.C. § 3127(2)(A). 
191. S. REp. No. 1097, supra note 11, at 90, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
2178. "The proposed legislation is not designed to prevent the tracing of phone calls. 
The use of a 'pen register,' for example, would be permissible." Id. 
192. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(h)(1988) provides "[i]t shall not be unlawful under this 
chapter (i) to use a pen register or trap and trace device." Id. 
193. See H.R. REp. No. 1609, supra note 53, at 4-8, reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.CAN. at 6164-68. 
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1976.194 That is exactly what Judge Korman attempted to do in del­
egating approval of a Title III application to a magistrate. Thus, a 
decision upholding Judge Korman's action would have been more 
consistent with Congress' intent in enacting the Magistrates Act. 
C. 	 Delegation of Title III Authority to a Magistrate Does Not 

Violate the Fourth Amendment 

When the language of a statute does not provide a clear grant 
of authority, the policy of the Supreme Court has been to seek an 
alternative which avoids raising potential constitutional ques­
tions.195 Although the Second Circuit did not express concern over 
the constitutionality of a wiretap authorized by a magistrate, its rea­
soning was based, in part, on the fact that a wiretap does implicate 
Fourth Amendment privacy rights.196 The Second Circuit reasoned 
that congressional concern for privacy rights was one factor that led 
to the enactment of Title III. As a result of this concern, the court 
held that the language of the Magistrates Act must be strictly con­
strued in determining whether the delegation of Title III authority 
was permissible.197 
However, neither the language of Title 111,198 nor its legislative 
history, indicate that Congress believed there was a constitutional 
requirement that an Article III judge authorize a wiretap.199 The 
original requirement that a wiretap could not be used unless a war­
rant had been obtained arose from the Supreme Court's holding in 
Katz v. United States that electronic surveillance was an invasion of 
privacy that implicated Fourth Amendment rights.2OO Title Ill's au­
thorization provision is designed to satisfy the Katz criteria "that 
the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer ... be inter­
194. See H.R. REp. No. 1609, supra note 53, at 10, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
at 6172. 
195. Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 864 (1989). "It is our settled policy to 
avoid an interpretation of a federal statute that engenders constitutional issues if a rea­
sonable alternative interpretation poses no constitutional question." Id. 
196. 	 In re United States, 10 F.3d at 938. 
197. 	 Id. 
198. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(9)(b) (1988) grants wiretap authority to "a judge of any 
court of general criminal jurisdiction of a State." Id. 
199. See S. REp. No. 1097, supra note 11, at 97, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
2179. Congress granted wiretap authority to state and federal court judges to ensure 
warrant approval would be handled responsibly, not because it believed authorization 
by an Article III judge was required by the Fourth Amendment. See supra note 36. 
200. 	 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353-56 (1967). 
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posed between the citizen and the police."201 The Katz Court re­
quired only the judgment of a judicial officer, rather than an Article 
III judge, to satisfy the warrant criteria. As such, there is little 
doubt that a magistrate would satisfy the constitutional wiretap 
warrant requirement enunciated in Katz. 
. The mere existence of a constitutional question does not force 
the conclusion that magistrates are precluded from approving sur­
veillance applications. Search warrants, as well as warrants for pen 
registers and trap and trace devices, which may be issued by a mag­
istrate,zo2 raise similar constitutional questions. The Katz Court 
based its warrant requirement on the similarity between electronic 
surveillance and physical searches of an individual's person or prop­
erty.203 Because the rights protected by these types of warrants are 
similar, it is consistent that they should both be approved by the 
same judicial officer. Similarly, because a magistrate is permitted to 
authorize search warrants, pen registers and trap and trace devices, 
it follows that a magistrate should be permitted to issue wiretap 
warrants. 
However, these warrants are distinct in two significant areas. 
First, a search warrant provides notice to the suspect, while a wire­
tap warrant does not. Additionally, the lack of notice is inherent in 
the nature of a wiretap; in Katz, the Court acknowledged that no­
tice is not possible in wiretap situations, since notice would make it 
impossible to obtain the evidence that was the target of the tap.204 
The Katz Court held that a wiretap approved by a proper judicial 
officer could serve the "legitimate needs of law enforcement" while 
protecting the individual's right to privacy.205 The Supreme Court 
found the imposition of a layer of judicial authority between the 
police and the suspect essential to the preservation of the Fourth 
Amendment rights of an individual who was the target of a wire­
tap.206 Notice cannot be given to the target of a wiretap regardless 
of the judicial authority authorizing the tap. Similarly, no notice is 
given when pen registers or trap and trace devices are employed, 
yet both may be authorized by magistrates.207 
201. Id. at 357 (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,481-82 (1962». 
See supra notes 24 & 27 and accompanying text. 
202. Id. See supra note 135 for the statutory language authorizing a magistrate 
to approve the use of pen registers and trap and trace devices. 
203. Id. at 353. 
204. Id. at 355 n.16. 
205. Id. at 354-56. 
206. Id. at 357. 
207. 18 U.S.C. § 3127(2)(A) (1988). 
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Second, while a search warrant permits a one-time search, the 
wiretap warrant provides for a more intrusive continual monitoring 
of the suspect. The greater degree of intrusiveness was one of the 
reasons the Second Circuit found that search warrants were not 
analogous to Title III applications.208 However, this high level of 
intrusiveness exists regardless of who approves a Title III applica­
tion. Pen registers and trap and trace devices also involve continual 
monitoring of telephone activity, yet Congress specifically granted 
magistrates the authority to approve their use.209 
Because of the intrusiveness of wiretaps, commentators have 
argued for a stricter probable cause standard for wiretaps approved 
by any judicial officer.2lO Such a standard is better addressed by 
specifying the evidentiary requirements that constitute probable 
cause than by merely addressing who approves the warrant. Title 
III already requires greater detail in a wiretap application than is 
required for a search warrant.211 Any government agent engaged 
in investigating criminal activity may seek a search warrant.212 
Wiretap applications, however, may only be authorized by the "At­
torney General, Deputy Attorney General, Associate Attorney 
General, or any acting Assistant Attorney General, or Deputy As­
sistant Attorney General in the Criminal Division specifically desig­
nated by the Attorney General."213 Additionally, a wiretap may 
only be sought for the investigation of specified crimes,214 while a 
search warrant may be sought to obtain evidence of any criminal 
activity.2Is The application for a wiretap permit must also state that 
all other means of investigation have failed and provide a complete 
statement describing any previous wiretap applications regarding 
the subject of the surveillance.216 In contrast, a search warrant 
merely requires that there be probable cause.217 
208. In re United States, 10 F.3d 931, 938 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 
(1994). 
209. Id. 
210. Elan Gerstmann, Letting Katz Out of the Bag: Re-Evaluating Probable 
Cause in the Context of Electronic Eavesdropping, 22 Loy. U. Du. L.J. 193 (1990) (ar­
guing for the requirement that law enforcement officials show a higher degree of prob­
able cause in obtaining wiretap approval). 
211. Compare 18 U.S.C. §§ 2515-2518 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) with FED. R. <:RIM. 
P.41. 
212. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(h). 
213. § 2516(1) (Supp. V 1993). 
214. § 2516(1)(a)-(n) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
215. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b). 
216. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(c), (e) (1988). 
217. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c). 
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By providing strict requirements under Title III, Congress has 
established a more stringent probable cause standard for wiretaps. 
However, whether more stringent standards are required is not the 
issue in this case. The intrusion into the privacy of a suspect is the 
critical issue involved in the issuance of search or wiretap warrants. 
As noted by the Katz Court, it is the need to protect personal pri­
vacy that necessitates a warrant in either case.218 A search warrant 
issued by a magistrate satisfies the strictures of the Fourth Amend­
ment for searches that intrude on personal privacy. Similarly, a 
wiretap application approved by the same judicial officer should 
satisfy the Katz criteria that a judicial officer be interposed between 
the police and a suspect who is the subject of a wiretap.219 
CONCLUSION 
In In re United States ,220 the Second Circuit employed a restric­
tive interpretation of both the Federal Magistrates Act and Title III. 
This interpretation is inconsistent with the congressional intent un­
derlying the passage and subsequent amendments to the Federal 
Magistrates Act. The Magistrates Act was passed to improve the 
efficiency of the judicial system by granting district court judges 
broad discretion to delegate a wide range of tasks to magistrates. 
Congress reacted to the failure of courts to experiment with innova­
tive uses of magistrates by amending the Act in 1976 to create the 
"pretrial matter" and "additional duties" clauses. 
The district court judge's decision to delegate Title III author­
ity to a magistrate was consistent with the type of experimentation 
Congress sought to encourage in an effort to improve judicial effi­
ciency. As Judge Korman noted, Title III imposes ongoing duties 
on the judicial officer who approves a Title III application. There­
fore, delegation of Title III authority would shift those duties to a 
magistrate, freeing the district court judge to devote additional time 
to adjudicatory duties that cannot be delegated. 
The delegation of Title III authority is also consistent with the 
criteria developed by the Supreme Court in analyzing additional 
duties that may be delegated to a magistrate. This is particularly 
true in light of the Court's decision to use a magistrate's enumer­
ated powers as the basis for determining whether delegation of an­
other duty is consistent with congressional intent. The probable 
218. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353-55 (1967). 
219. Id. at 357. 
220. 10 F.3d 931 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 64 (1994). 
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cause determination required by the approval of a Title III applica­
tion is sufficiently analogous to the probable cause determinations 
already made by magistrates in approving search and arrest war­
rants. Additionally, magistrates are specifically authorized to ap­
prove the use of other forms of electronic surveillance, namely pen 
registers and trap and trace devices. The fact that Congress granted 
this authority demonstrates congressional confidence in magis­
trates' ability to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights in authorizing 
the use of this type of electronic surveillance. 
Delegation of Title III authority is also consistent with Title 
Ill's goal of satisfying the Katz requirement that a responsible judi­
cial officer be interposed between law enforcement officials and in­
dividuals who are the subject of electronic surveillance.221 
Congress demonstrated its confidence in magistrates' competence 
by enlarging their duties through the 1976 amendments to the Mag­
istrates Act and by specifically including magistrates within the Pri­
vacy Act's definition of a court of competent jurisdiction. 
Although a strong argument can be made that Title III author­
ity may be delegated to a magistrate under the existing language of 
Title III and the Magistrates Act, the Second Circuit's decision 
makes it unlikely that such a delegation will be made in the future. 
Law enforcement officials cannot proceed under a Title III applica­
tion authorized by a magistrate without the fear that the evidence 
obtained would later be ruled inadmissible. Therefore, Congress 
should address this issue by amending Title III to expressly grant 
district court judges the option of delegating Title III authority to a 
magistrate. Such an amendment would preserve the involvement of 
district court judges in Title III applications while providing a judge 
with the option to delegate TItle III authority to a competent magis­
trate. An amendment of this type would preserve the privacy safe­
guards created by TItle III while enhancing the judicial efficiency 
that is the fundamental goal of the Federal Magistrates Act. 
Thomas R. Garcia 
221. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357. 
